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Secret documents produced by Sardar Abdur Rahim ex-Chief Minister, NWFP. before the West Pakistan Assembly in September, 1955.

A. The case for ONE UNIT
1. The driving force behind the establishment of Pakistan, namely the unity and solidarity of the Islamic ideology which held Muslims as Indissolubly one and therefore worthy and capable of separate nationhood postulated working together in a common unity of ideal and vision without inferior distinctions of tribe, locality or parochial interest. The people of Pakistan has a right to be separate, because they were one. ( If they are not one, the process of partition is interminable). But in circumstances of our actual existence and seven years experience we have functioned from the other extreme of fragmentation, and if left unchecked are embarked on a process of atomization. The devastating effect this tendency has already had on the morals, faith and cohesion of our people and the obstacles it has placed in the way of forming even a pattern of future government are patent. This amounts to a national tragedy, because religious traditions and ideology apart, the facts of our situation; economically impoverished, under-developed and unevoked in all directions, gravely and instantly threatened by a powerful and resolved enemy, demand unity not as a distant and desirable ideal but as the minimum security of our existence. Islam and Nationalism, faith and patriotism, therefore, in our case, point in the same direction. the irony of our position is emphasized by comparison with India, which from a diversity and fragmentation derived both from ideology and the realities has progressed towards unity, while we, from unity have decayed towards disruption. If the rot is to be checked Pakistan must move towards a special ideological emphasis on unity.

Effective and fruitful unity between the East and West Wing of Pakistan, is for geographical and administrative reasons impossible of achievement. This basic weakness must be countered by the strength obtained by achieving complete effective unity within the two wings. (What we lose on the Swings, we must make up on the roundabouts). Luckily for Pakistan this has already been achieved in the East. Sylhet, Chitagong Hill Tracts etc. where all through history distinct from East Bengal, but rising above petty interests and realistically facing the threat of circumstances, they have merged, The West must follow the excellent example set by the East, and like them, become ONE UNIT.

2. The division of Pakistan, irreducibly, between East and West poses a problem of the highest complexity to Pakistani Statesmanship. Difficulties inherent in a vast geographical distance, hostility controlled indifference of language; in a distribution of population which runs in a direction directly contrary to the distribution of economic resources, contribution and burden (here detailed data would be necessary); variety, and in some cases, divergence of administrative and economic problems and, the separate handling they demand, create genuine and serious problems and conflicts which are the breeding ground of suspicion. Yet it is clear beyond discussion, that the two entities of Pakistan, East and West, must, if they are to exist. hang together, and develop a high degree of comradeship and cordiality in their mutual relationship, equally in their several and joint interest. How difficult the actual achievement of this commonly proclaimed aim is, is witnessed by the continual constitutional crisis of the past three years which bids fair to snuff out the very processes of democracy in our Country. The suspicion at the root of all deadlocks is the fear of the domination of one wing by the other. Unless the dangers of such a domination are laid to rest, once and for all, unless the very temptation to exploit the one or the other is removed-because the very possibility no longer exists, unless cordiality is based on interdependence, and interdependence on the realities of the mutual situation negotiations and talks, and all the paraphernalia of adjustments will only intensify the drift towards separation. There is only one way to remove these dangers and suspicions. The West and the East must be equally strong There Equally strong, they must stand in equal partnership. There must be no crevices and handles in the one to tempt disruption and exploitation in the other, For, with the best of intentions such temptations in democratic politics become irresistible. Therefore, West Pakistan must be one unit, which can hold out its hand in mutual co-operation and interdependence to the one unit of East Pakistan. No other solution of the constitutional riddle is possible. Nothing less can pave the way to a fruitful democracy.

The most obvious advantage of ONE UNIT is to the poorer provinces. They live today on subventions and doles with the resulting basic political subservience. In One unit their demands shall be as of right, the wealth and resource of the entire region as a part of their patrimony on which they are the first charge. Gradually, inevitably the distinctions will be smudged out in time, as is happening before our eyes within the districts of the Punjab. In any case, from the start, the distribution of beneficent services, which must necessarily be in a common pattern within a unit, will mean a tremendous advance to the poorer regions.

Similar advantage accrues to under-developed areas which left to themselves would not flower to their capacity. The surplus present resources of the richer areas would naturally flow to the development and building of future resources of the poorer areas, which within the Government of One Unit would be an automatic process, The economic reasons for One Unit are therefore overwhelming. Natural interdependence and patent inviolability of isolation would make any other arrangement a madness, which sooner or later must be renounced.

4. It need no stressing to realize that Pakistan is at present a very poor country. Yet our present system of administration, multiplying units and machinery of Government and assemblies and Public offices is one of the most wasteful in the world. It must be one of the first aims of our policy to assiduously husband our resources and to squeeze the optimum benefit out of each penny. We must realize that larger areas than West Pakistan all over the world are under one unitary Government, and that a more numerous population in pre-partition India was included within the single province of the Punjab (The saving effected by One Unit may be worked out).

5. The Political national ideological benefits of One Unit are obvious.

1. It would re-capture the spirit of unity, which we have so wantonly lost since Partition.
2. It would result in a significant improvement in Political leadership. It would militate towards the elimination of petty intrigue, small motives, parochial pulls, which in every province have brought politics to the district board level and bid fair to shame the affairs of small Town Committees, In a country as yet imperfectly trained to the subtle are of Government it would be appropriate to open outstanding talent anywhere to service everywhere and not by a multiplicity of offices compel a scaling down of abilities.
3. Politics on a large canvas will lead to a larger vision. Small units entrench local oppressions. The Hari, the tenant, the Kammi suffers. But in government of one Unit, the condition of the least progressive area will have immediately to approximate to the reform of the most progressive regions, and the forces of progress will blow more freely, with less constriction in a wider atmosphere. For the oppressed, for the dispossessed, One Unit presents an immediate hope.

7. The smaller provinces are apprehensive that their effective share in power will decrease. There will be fewer Ministries, fewer Public jobs for each area. This is true, but it does not affect the enormous majority of the people, and for them it is perhaps the most convincing inducement.

    In actual fact, however, One Unit will mean more effective power to the people of West Pakistan than they have hitherto enjoyed. The present position is that all real power lies with the Central Government in which Bengal has the dominating share. We are all co-partners in a minority share. But in the One Unit Scheme, real power will go to the two Units of West Pakistan and East Pakistan, where each partner will enjoy his share in full possession, In this effective power, for the first time given unreservedly to the West, the smaller units will enjoy a larger share than they can obtain under any other dispensation. Their proportion of representation in the One Unit legislature will be significantly larger than in any all Pakistan legislature. In the economic field, the position, particularly of the poor and under developed provinces, would be even more favorable. At present, Bengal shares in Central expenditure out of all proportion to its contribution. With the autonomy envisaged in the federation of two units, this,. burden will be considerably lightened, and the joint share of the consequent saving will be available for the development and improvement of the smaller units of West Pakistan.

      To ensure full satisfaction to smaller units and to obviate the neglect of any substantial region, I would suggest a study ,)f the Swiss system of Government which by sanctified conventions gives judicious share to all its main provinces and cultural components in every Government that is formed.

B. POLITICAL CAMPAIGN FOR ONE UNIT

1. It the One Unit Scheme is to outlive the Government which imposes it, it must be based on the willing support of the people. This is only possible through a political campaign which aims at converting the hearts, convincing the mind,,, and arousing the enthusiasm of the people. I am convinced That it properly organized, this end can be achieved because I believe that the following assumptions are in fact true.

1. That the One Unit Scheme is in effect beneficial to every part of West Pakistan and particularly to the smaller units.
2. That the common people have no hostility to it.
3. That the average citizen has, if properly assisted, enough intelligence and enough vision to see through the petty faction and narrow selfishness of the small interested group of disrupters.

  The first necessity of the present contest, therefore, is that we must clear the decks before we launch our political campaign. In other words, we must silence and render inoperative all opposition of witch we are morally convinced that it is motivated by evil. We must take the benefit of full and firm exercise of authority to create an opportunity for our voice to be heard. I would give warning that in my opinion it would be fatal to launch our political campaign if, for a period, opposition is not effectively stilled and a time gained for our voice to gain volume amidst surrounding silence. Otherwise amidst the legacy of confusion which the present dispensation has inherited, we will lose all bearings amidst the babble which our first whispers will arouse.

  In my view, we could have achieved On Unit only at two stages of our history: (a) During the first days of our enthusiasm, when Pakistan was established; our unity and solidarity evoked by struggle, crowned by Access, sanctified in faith, stilled all lesser rumors under the guidance of the Quaid; (b) Now, when enthusiasm is at its lowest level, when expedient after expedient has failed, when a bitter frustration has settled upon our people and when in hopelessness and despair they are ready to accept dictation and be led where you will, so long as you lead them firmly, tail them now; and I fear, you fail them for all times.

I would guard against the charge of inconsistency. With one voice I assert that One Unit can only be obtained and preserved with consent; with the other I demand that all opposition must be stilled. Yet the two are not inconsistent. In the first place, we must win by force a chance to have our say. But once we have had our chance, we must be judged, sustained or rejected by the free approval of the people. I have no doubt that in a fine and just cause it will be forthcoming.

3. Our political campaign must, in its planning and initiation, be carefully organized and competently led. From the start, from today, we must provide for it a well-knit directive organization. I would suggest the establishment of a Work Party, a committee of Action, a tactical G.H.Q. that has patent authority, diversified talent and full effective representation of all provincial leadership. It must be the final authority to give shape to the ideology, to direct the campaign to give coherence and coordination to all aspects of the political effort.

4. The first aspect of the campaign is to gain the endorsement of the present representatives of the people-in all the provinces through resolution passed by the Provincial Assemblies, the Provincial Leagues etc. - we may call this the Parliamentary aspect.

  The real requisite for this is only one. Select your leadership in each province and put them firmly in place. Give them your entire confidence, pledge them your full and unreserved support in governance. Let them be the judges of the necessities and requirements of each situation, do not confuse them about the present system of law courts. Whether the real centers of administration will be I0 or 12 or more rationally delimited divisions presided over by senior-most responsible officers who are capable of an(empowered to dispose all matters that at present are decided at the provincial level, or whether a more rigid centralization is 6med at? From the very start, an informal working party should clarify the ideas of the present leadership on these points so that ,Be know what our people are to be conversed about.
 
C. Objections to ONE UNIT

1. The pattern of Provincial Governments is entrenched in our political consciousness. Any attempt to remove or even change the pattern will encounter strong opposition, particularly amongst the smaller Provinces, i.e., in all save Punjab. We must distinguish between the genuine fears and suspicions of small units who apprehended engulfment by the Punjab, and the feverish conspiracy of disrupters planning to weaken Pakistan or the design of small town politics to preserve undeserved power. The second can be summarily dealt with. But the first have to be met and stilled. It is my conviction that we have no right to advocate and advance ONE UNIT unless we are morally convinced and can convince our brothers in the small Provinces that our Scheme is to the first advantage of the smallest and the weakest amongst us. We must, therefore, in cooperation with the leaders of the other Provinces give sufficient, precision to the ONE UNIT Scheme such as effectively and institutionally remove the genuine objections against it.

2.Some of the objections most frequently advanced are the following:-

1. In a unitary form of Government, one person one vote, Punjab, it is argued, would overwhelm all others. There are counter-arguments of considerable plausibility, but they would emotionally satisfy no one; they did not satisfy Punjab viz.-a-viz Bengal. A solution of this difficulty, which in many ways is the gravest, lies in the adoption of an imperfect democracy which so adjusts the electorate and the constituencies as to give a more than 50% representation in the Assembly to the non -Punjab districts of One Unit. This arrangement will have to remain in force for a considerable period of time.
2. Services: The small units fear that with t h e p re se n t better education and standards in the Punjab areas, institution of common services would crowd out their own present citizens from Government resolved leadership. In many ways this objection has the largest emotional appeal, because it must be clearly realized that the Provincial services everywhere are the most vocal and influential part of the population, that they dominate the intellectual atmosphere, and are the real focus of behind the scene politics. In any case, their determined conspiratorial opposition would wreck the One Unit Government even if it takes actual shape. This objection, therefore, must be adequately met. Many solutions present themselves. Existing services will of course be preserved. Subordinate services can continue to be recruited locally. The real problem is the question of future recruitment to Provincial service. I feel a solution, through quota and special representation, must be sought which guarantees the minimum of the present proportion of each small Unit’s services (conceived) for at least a period of 15 years, and even for a longer time if facilities and educated man-power is not by then everywhere equalized.
3. Administrative complexity and remoteness.

An argument that will greatly appeal to the common man is that a Unitary Government for all West Pakistan would make the fulfillment of his common needs - his daily application permits, complaints against and redress of administrative high handiness, his legal remedies - too remote, too expensive, and therefore illusory for him. This is a serious and a genuine objection. A strictly centralized Government for West Pakistan would mean a negation of effective beneficent Government. Large devolution, particularly in matters of legal remedy and the mechanism of the beneficent departments is an absolute requisite before One Unit can be a genuinely workable proposition. In fact, the aim of our future policy should be to bring the benefits and operations of administration closer to the common man, rather than to make them more remote.
If for no other reason, then to give clarification to meet the above objection, it is necessary to work out the One Unit Scheme in some detail. Its administrative implications must be known before they can convince. What shall be their position, or dishearten them by your own intervention in their political handling, which would arouse in them the suspicions of intrigues. You have given them a difficult task in which they are risking their necks. To prevaricate, to hesitate, to look back would be nothing short of treachery.
(One guidance alone is necessary. Draft the resolution to be passed by the Assemblies, in consultation with them, but under your guidance. Khairpur has made a mess.) A time limit must be set within which this task has to be completed.
4. The second aspect of the campaign, namely, public propaganda must be launched contemporaneously. It will take a considerable time to gain momentum or win significant approval, but if (a) the assent of representative leaders, i.e., M.L. As .has been induced, and (b) no doubt has been left in any mind that disrupters will be handled with sufficient firmness to discourage any inducement towards fishing gratuitously or safely in troubled waters, there is no doubt that the inherent logic and merit of the scheme will win complete and enthusiastic ultimate support - -ultimate’ to be understood in terms of weeks and months.

The mechanics and organizations of the campaign require expert management and must be entrusted to the suggested Work Party who should function through specialized sub-Committees incharge of each category of work. The main categories of work are:-
1. Statements by prominent persons; planned to achieve a gradual mounting.
2. A coordinated Press campaign, ideologically controlled to lay similar emphasis everywhere on phased aspects of the movement.
3. Pamphlets and tracts.
4. Intensive political work directed with particular reference to special group such as
1. the intelligentsia, i.e., Lawyers. (bar room), professors, doctors etc.
2. Students,
3. The dispossessed, i.e., labor, tenants, small owners. In my view, their support to us will bathe firmest and the most fruitful. This support can and be should be further evoked by the present regime’s (including provincial regimes) constructive and immediate steps towards progress, particularly through agrarian reform and a sustained campaign to bring down prices, which will underline and emphasize the leadership for One Units also the leadership for justice and progress. As in other directions, the first shot here too may be fired in Sindh,
4. Mullahs may be used, but with extreme care because they are experts at abusing campaigns to secure their own rehabilitation, and then to use the platform gained to their own designs. If employed at all, only the least prominent rank and file should be selected, carefully avoiding the prominent practitioners.
5. Direct mass contact through a spate of public meetings all over the country, addressed by properly briefed speakers. As ‘Jalsas’ are the traditional currency of our politics, they will be the culmination of our campaign and would require very careful organization.
5. A final word about the role of the Punjab. At present we do not require too much noise in the Punjab, it will only put other people’s backup and cause suspicion. In fact our leaders should be very cautious in issuing statements or throwing their weight about. But two things must be borne in mind: (a) our best and most enthusiastic political workers are in the Punjab. They should be organized and put in readiness to be used in full force when ever and wherever they are needed; (b) It would not do to neglect completely the ‘climate of opinion’. It must be realized that in time Punjab may have to volunteer substantial concessions, which, I believe, will not be readily forthcoming. At the same time, the headquarters and motive force of all really disruptive leaderships, which will doubtless instigate and sustain opposition in all other Provinces, is located in the Punjab. Therefore, the leadership of the Punjab should have the solidarity and the competence to play its decisive role when the time comes, and from now on it should have the astuteness to keep a grip on the "climate of opinion".

 (N.B.- All resolutions to be passed in the Punjab should be drafted in Karachi.)
6. Lands: The new lands being developed in Sindh and the effect the One Unit Scheme will have on their Occupation and disposal is a matter which particularly agitates the Sindhi mind. Not strictly patriotic or national, this is nevertheless a natural apprehension because in this case the prospects of One Unit operate to the disadvantage of a long nursed and at that stage legitimate expectation.This problem has two aspects. Are the Sindh readership concerned for the Sindhi masses; In that case a just solution can be found. These lands are a trust for the poor and the dispossessed, Let us fix a priority for their use. They shall be first used to give an economic land holding unit to every single landless cultivator or "Hari’ of Sindh. Before that aim is fully achieved, not a single are shall be available to a non-Sindhi. But after this category is exhausted, they shall be available to other landless cultivators from areas outside Sindh.)n no case must this new resource of the nation be dispersed to enrich those who have already enough of their own. The other aspect is that some Sindhi leaders may consider land to be a legitimate prize for the already very prosperous Sindh landlords. This really is not a provincial matter. It is a question of moral and social policy, which affects the whole future shape, and ideology of Pakistan. I think, the answer is clear. Whether One Unit comes into being or not, no patriotic Government in Pakistan can allow reactionary policies which polarize wealth, and enrich the few while hundreds and thousands land less workers starve to their death.
7. There is the cultural objection. provincial cultures, the Sindhi, the Baluchi, the Pathan will languish or even be suppressed, it administrative provincial units are merged in a single whole.

This is a specious argument. It has already been pointed out that our present pattern of cultural diversity does not follow the provincial boundary line. Large and significant varieties of language and culture exist in each province and overflow every frontier. It may further be asked to what extent in the past seven years of provincial diversity has any province made any advance in the matter of the development and promotion of distinctive cultures? An ideal so infrequently agitated cannot lie very close to the heart.

Yet cultural diversities exist, They give richness and variety to our life. No body may have done anything to promote their natural development, yet to do so is to quicken the throb of life amongst our people. The Government of One Unit should be pledged to it. The existing linguistic facilities and privilege must be preserved, and every distinctive variety of cultural expression should be given the autonomy and the encouragement to develop.

3. The main problem of constitution - making is a precise definition of the federal structure, which, in effect, amounts to a settlement of the relationship between East Pakistan and the Provinces of West Pakistan. We cannot even enter into such a discussion, unless West Pakistan can speak as one entity: If the aim is interdependence and the absence of any possibility of domination, than East and West must face each other as two partners in a negotiation. A fragmented West Pakistan-bas really nothing to ask of East Pakistan, because the realities of the situation in any conceivable constitutional pattern would already have given East Pakistan an inconvertible superiority.

Therefore, the first step towards a general constitutional settlement is the achievement of unity in the provinces of West Pakistan through the establishment of one administrative Province for the whole of the Western region.

4. I think it is possible to achieve the formation of one Unit for West Pakistan because I believe that certain basic assumptions do in fact operate. They are:-

  If One Unit is achieved by force, it will have to be maintained by force, thus making autocracy a necessity of our situation. Non-political handling on a purely administrative authoritarian level would therefore be disastrous. We must therefore achieve ‘One Unit’ through political methods. I suggest the following phases:-

7. The first phase is an immediate one. It is a negative one. It consists in clearing the decks. All obvious committed’ obstacles in the way of ‘One Unit’ must be removed. On political terms our country is insufficiently developed. In this atmosphere a clear and firm indication of which way the wind is blowing, does actually help the wind to blow that way. The following steps should be taken:-

  (ii) N.W.F.P. has been mishandled. Rashid and the old Muslim Leaguers would have obviously risen to the occasion in support. Qayyum’s exit had cleared their path, given them enormous prestige by removing a dishonest but much publicized obstacle. But a much more formidable force has replaced Qaiyum - the Red shirts - which have been gratuitously rehabilitated. If the rehabilitation had been on precise conditions, there would have been some point to it, although Abdul Ghaffar could never have been trusted therefore, why conjure up a friend safely corked in the bottle but even this does not seem to have been done. And those who give Khan Sahib a political personality independent from Abdul Ghaffar Khan will soon know their mistake. United they stand, divided only Khan Sahib falls.

The Position must be retrieved, Firstly by giving full unreserved support to Rashid, stilling his suspicious, fortifying his nerve, encouraging him to ignore Red Shirts and strengthen the old leaguers thus countering the irresistible impression which must have percolated to the remotest Frontier village. Qurban Ali Khan can do this well. Secondly by completely ignoring Abdul Ghaffar. No negotiations, no parley because through them no will strengthen himself politically and then put down his strength in a volt-face to overwhelm us. There should be no doubt about it that politically we are no match for him, and our ideological superiority we have ourselves renounced.

(iii) Punjab must be kept quiet. The folly of our friends most be checked. At a later stage Punjab will have to take the lead. At that time I hope an effective intelligent Punjab leadership will have been put in place both at the Center and at Lahore.

(iv) States must by their condition bow to authority. Bahawalpur might have been tackled better by getting a resolution in favor before dismissal of the Ministry. Surely political considerations should have preceded administrative one. Now the best alternative is to get the. Muslim League to endorse. Makhdumul Mulk would love to do so. If acceptance of One Unit is a condition of continuing in present power, all states will fall in line.

(v) A little persuasion can bring Balochistan’s League leaders in line. The Jirga has never yet been known to say ‘no’ to authority.

(c) While the deck is thus speedily cleared in the West, it is possible to negotiate with Suharwardy either to openly support One Unit or to adopt a neutral attitude of distinct benevolence.

(A) A private unpublished meeting of pro-One Unit provincial leaders (in power everywhere) to devise and agree on a program and timetable.

(B) Political work in Sindh and N.W.F.P. - through contact with known leaders of influence, judicious exercise of patronage including foreign assignments they oppose One Unit for fear of losing jobs, let them get jobs) leading to passage of resolutions supporting One Unit in the Muslim League and the Assemblies. Khuhro and Rashdi would certainly succeed, if you give them real unreserved support and loyally stand by them - now and later.

(C) Balochistan, Bahawalpur and the States can reach the same stage contemporaneously’ with less difficulty. Only support some political man there, don’t exclusively depend on D.Cs.

(D) At the first indication of One Unit support in the smaller provinces, Punjab should come forth with substantial concessions to still the fears, honestly and genuinely and effectively, of domination. These concessions should be timed not to appear as inducements as a willing contribution to an ideal proposed and supported by others.

(E) At this stage it may be possible to procure unreserved support of Suharwardy and even his actual encouragement.

10. We cannot afford to give more than 4 weeks to the process envisaged in para 7 above, because the achievement of One Unit is only a necessary parliamentary to the general constitutional settlement which is the pre-condition of the restoration of democracy.  Acceptance of One Unit by Western leadership, who should be kept in place of power to consolidate the gains achieved, must be immediately and dramatically followed by highest level negotiations with the genuine leaders of Bengal primarily Suharwardy, because he has the ambition and the intelligence to respond. On the basis of a tout-subject Center, two provinces, federal parity, complete provincial and .cultural autonomy, I think it might be possible to gain his support as soon as he returns to Karachi and before he goes to East Pakistan.

11. If agreement on One Unit and constitutional pattern is arrived at this must be announced as a common platform of a united East West leadership on which they are prepared to face the electorate.

12. At this stage two developments should immediately follow (in January, I hope):

(a) Broadening of the Central Cabinet to include topmost popular leaders from the West and particularly from the East - a real national Government.

(b) The immediate constitution and convening of a Constituent Assembly, indirectly from Provincial Legislatures, to frame a constitution within a specified period quite plausibly within 3 months. The C.A. should have not other task except to frame a constitution and should not serve as a Legislature. As previous constitutional agreement will already have been reached and will be serving as a mandate to a vast majority of the newly elected C.A., and as the interim Cabinet will already have been broad-based, I have no fears from either the one or the other. People who have no power, will not delay constitution—making. People who really represent the people and who by having reached an agreement will have capitalized on a wave of popularity, will not fear elections.

14. I need not labor that a recent solution suggested by Malik Noon has no merit. Constitution making by ordinance has its obvious disadvantage, It does not achieve One Unit. It does not bring about political agreement. In fact the one real merit of the present regime in that it can hold a pistol to achieve political constitutional agreement. If the pistol is used for any other purpose, I think, the destiny of Pakistan have been betrayed.