G. M. Syed-The Case of Sindh
All Rights Reserved to Naeen Sindh Academy Karachi Sindh©

Secret documents produced by Sardar Abdur Rahim ex-Chief Minister, NWFP. before the West Pakistan Assembly in September, 1955.

A. The case for ONE UNIT
1. The driving force behind the establishment of Pakistan, namely the unity and solidarity of the Islamic ideology which held Muslims as Indissolubly one and therefore worthy and capable of separate nationhood postulated working together in a common unity of ideal and vision without inferior distinctions of tribe, locality or parochial interest. The people of Pakistan has a right to be separate, because they were one. ( If they are not one, the process of partition is interminable). But in circumstances of our actual existence and seven years experience we have functioned from the other extreme of fragmentation, and if left unchecked are embarked on a process of atomization. The devastating effect this tendency has already had on the morals, faith and cohesion of our people and the obstacles it has placed in the way of forming even a pattern of future government are patent. This amounts to a national tragedy, because religious traditions and ideology apart, the facts of our situation; economically impoverished, under-developed and unevoked in all directions, gravely and instantly threatened by a powerful and resolved enemy, demand unity not as a distant and desirable ideal but as the minimum security of our existence. Islam and Nationalism, faith and patriotism, therefore, in our case, point in the same direction. the irony of our position is emphasized by comparison with India, which from a diversity and fragmentation derived both from ideology and the realities has progressed towards unity, while we, from unity have decayed towards disruption. If the rot is to be checked Pakistan must move towards a special ideological emphasis on unity.

Effective and fruitful unity between the East and West Wing of Pakistan, is for geographical and administrative reasons impossible of achievement. This basic weakness must be countered by the strength obtained by achieving complete effective unity within the two wings. (What we lose on the Swings, we must make up on the roundabouts). Luckily for Pakistan this has already been achieved in the East. Sylhet, Chitagong Hill Tracts etc. where all through history distinct from East Bengal, but rising above petty interests and realistically facing the threat of circumstances, they have merged, The West must follow the excellent example set by the East, and like them, become ONE UNIT.

2. The division of Pakistan, irreducibly, between East and West poses a problem of the highest complexity to Pakistani Statesmanship. Difficulties inherent in a vast geographical distance, hostility controlled indifference of language; in a distribution of population which runs in a direction directly contrary to the distribution of economic resources, contribution and burden (here detailed data would be necessary); variety, and in some cases, divergence of administrative and economic problems and, the separate handling they demand, create genuine and serious problems and conflicts which are the breeding ground of suspicion. Yet it is clear beyond discussion, that the two entities of Pakistan, East and West, must, if they are to exist. hang together, and develop a high degree of comradeship and cordiality in their mutual relationship, equally in their several and joint interest. How difficult the actual achievement of this commonly proclaimed aim is, is witnessed by the continual constitutional crisis of the past three years which bids fair to snuff out the very processes of democracy in our Country. The suspicion at the root of all deadlocks is the fear of the domination of one wing by the other. Unless the dangers of such a domination are laid to rest, once and for all, unless the very temptation to exploit the one or the other is removed-because the very possibility no longer exists, unless cordiality is based on interdependence, and interdependence on the realities of the mutual situation negotiations and talks, and all the paraphernalia of adjustments will only intensify the drift towards separation. There is only one way to remove these dangers and suspicions. The West and the East must be equally strong There Equally strong, they must stand in equal partnership. There must be no crevices and handles in the one to tempt disruption and exploitation in the other, For, with the best of intentions such temptations in democratic politics become irresistible. Therefore, West Pakistan must be one unit, which can hold out its hand in mutual co-operation and interdependence to the one unit of East Pakistan. No other solution of the constitutional riddle is possible. Nothing less can pave the way to a fruitful democracy.

  3. The administrative unity of the West would only evoke, reflect and institutionalize existing basic unties.   (a) By and large, and in basic reality, the Western Provinces of Pakistan are culturally one. The unity of pattern, given richness and cohesion by Islam, goes further and deeper: worked upon by the same processes of history, conditioned by almost identical physical circumstances, inter-mixed in the same racial vortex, liable over the ages and now to identical cultural influences to identical strains -and dangers,-the variety in the West is a variety more of design than of fabric. This becomes clear if you notice how the people of West Pakistan merge imperceptibly into one other as you go from the East to the West or from the South to the North, the small distinctions nowhere confined to existing provinces, and in no case whatsoever coinciding with administrative boundaries: the people of Hazara closer to Pindi Division, Mianwali and Dera Ghazi Khan more akin to their western than to their eastern neighbors, Bahawalpur and Multan almost one and equally distinguished from Gujarat and Gujranwala, Khanpur cultural pattern with Sindh, so much of Sindh more logically a part of Balochistan, half of Balochistan kin’s to the Pathans. Such distinctions of course exist in all countries, much more Pronounced in England and in France, in Switzerland and in Italy than in West Pakistan, but nowhere in our region is the distinction a break which would raise the suspicion of separate nationhood. There is, of course the distinction of language. This again is not confined to Pakistan, and hardly any country in the World working a unitary form of Government is without it (compare, England, France, Italy). But even in the matter of language, provincial boundaries do not in any manner reflect the cultural patterns, and if the sine Quo non of a province was to contain one and only one language, we would have to lacerate West Pakistan into almost as many provinces as there are now districts. The linguistic destination, therefore, vital and necessary though it undoubtedly is, has no inescapable administrative consequences. It has not in the past overridden other cementing forces to cause decisive differentiation. It will not in the future. But every linguistic region must of course whether or not it bears any relationship to a present administrative boundary be afforded the fullest right, security and autonomy to develop and preserve its distinctive language and culture.   (b) Even more significantly, West Pakistan is economically one unit. Everywhere in the province of the West, the pattern, and the needs, the resources and the demands of their development, the manners of employment, the adjustment of the classes are the same. Moreover they are strictly closely, inextricably, inter-dependent. The same agricultural economy, watered by the same rivers, producing the same commodities subject to the same markets and the same influence, giving occasion to the same pattern of future industrialization which will be fruitful only if they are integrated to the common maximum advantage. mineral and hydroelectric resources located in one place but only consumable in the other, the same system of communication terminating in the same common part. Everywhere our economy presents the same local problems, which can only be resolved, if they are handled in the interest of the entire region as a whole. The electric resources of the Frontier must sustain the industry of the Punjab, the capital accumulation of the Punjab must bring about equalization of prosperity through development in Balochistan and the Tribal Regions, the resources of Sindh and Bahawalpur must fortify the sturdy warriors in the North-West hindrance and ineptitude. This happens even today, but the obvious aim must be to ensure a smooth co-ordination, which is instinctive and automatic, and as of right; and this only a single administration can bring. Provinces as they are situated today are endowed with very unequal resources, in many cases inadequate. even for efficient administration, certainly for optimum development, and for the full evocation of potentialities. (Here we may give data of present financial condition and the use made of resources). If Provincial separation ossifies further through greater autonomy which is the only alternative, we shall perpetualise provinces into creditors and debtors, resulting in political frustration, jealously and hostility not dissimilar to the tensions of pre-partition India, and at the least squandering resources, hindering development, through the wastefulness of the poor and the nagging parsimony of the rich.

The most obvious advantage of ONE UNIT is to the poorer provinces. They live today on subventions and doles with the resulting basic political subservience. In One unit their demands shall be as of right, the wealth and resource of the entire region as a part of their patrimony on which they are the first charge. Gradually, inevitably the distinctions will be smudged out in time, as is happening before our eyes within the districts of the Punjab. In any case, from the start, the distribution of beneficent services, which must necessarily be in a common pattern within a unit, will mean a tremendous advance to the poorer regions.

Similar advantage accrues to under-developed areas which left to themselves would not flower to their capacity. The surplus present resources of the richer areas would naturally flow to the development and building of future resources of the poorer areas, which within the Government of One Unit would be an automatic process, The economic reasons for One Unit are therefore overwhelming. Natural interdependence and patent inviolability of isolation would make any other arrangement a madness, which sooner or later must be renounced.

4. It need no stressing to realize that Pakistan is at present a very poor country. Yet our present system of administration, multiplying units and machinery of Government and assemblies and Public offices is one of the most wasteful in the world. It must be one of the first aims of our policy to assiduously husband our resources and to squeeze the optimum benefit out of each penny. We must realize that larger areas than West Pakistan all over the world are under one unitary Government, and that a more numerous population in pre-partition India was included within the single province of the Punjab (The saving effected by One Unit may be worked out).

5. The Political national ideological benefits of One Unit are obvious.

  1. It would re-capture the spirit of unity, which we have so wantonly lost since Partition.
  2. It would result in a significant improvement in Political leadership. It would militate towards the elimination of petty intrigue, small motives, parochial pulls, which in every province have brought politics to the district board level and bid fair to shame the affairs of small Town Committees, In a country as yet imperfectly trained to the subtle are of Government it would be appropriate to open outstanding talent anywhere to service everywhere and not by a multiplicity of offices compel a scaling down of abilities.
  3. Politics on a large canvas will lead to a larger vision. Small units entrench local oppressions. The Hari, the tenant, the Kammi suffers. But in government of one Unit, the condition of the least progressive area will have immediately to approximate to the reform of the most progressive regions, and the forces of progress will blow more freely, with less constriction in a wider atmosphere. For the oppressed, for the dispossessed, One Unit presents an immediate hope.
6. It can be argued that in the facts of our present situation, One Unit is not just an ideal, it is the only possible way out. Bengal has already declared-for complete provincial autonomy, with a Center limited to three subjects. From all indications, a reversal of this verdict by Bengal is outside practical politics. As a consequence, the remaining subjects which include all development, all social and economic adjustment, all Government with which the common man is concerned, will have to fall to the provinces. By the very nature of things, small provinces just cannot physically manage the new responsibilities that are thus being thrust upon them. In isolation, even units like the Punjab, Sindh and N.W.F.P. would be forced by such provincial autonomy to chaotic over-lapping, hideous waste, pathetic planlessness. The strength, stability and resource of a One-Unit Government can only manage such autonomy.    The solution of Zonal Federation is illusory. It is even more wasteful than the present position. It offers no answer to the basic riddle of the constitutional problem. It makes no response to the whole argument of the above note. (the arguments against Zonal Federation, in detail, would require a separate note),

7. The smaller provinces are apprehensive that their effective share in power will decrease. There will be fewer Ministries, fewer Public jobs for each area. This is true, but it does not affect the enormous majority of the people, and for them it is perhaps the most convincing inducement.

    In actual fact, however, One Unit will mean more effective power to the people of West Pakistan than they have hitherto enjoyed. The present position is that all real power lies with the Central Government in which Bengal has the dominating share. We are all co-partners in a minority share. But in the One Unit Scheme, real power will go to the two Units of West Pakistan and East Pakistan, where each partner will enjoy his share in full possession, In this effective power, for the first time given unreservedly to the West, the smaller units will enjoy a larger share than they can obtain under any other dispensation. Their proportion of representation in the One Unit legislature will be significantly larger than in any all Pakistan legislature. In the economic field, the position, particularly of the poor and under developed provinces, would be even more favorable. At present, Bengal shares in Central expenditure out of all proportion to its contribution. With the autonomy envisaged in the federation of two units, this,. burden will be considerably lightened, and the joint share of the consequent saving will be available for the development and improvement of the smaller units of West Pakistan.

      To ensure full satisfaction to smaller units and to obviate the neglect of any substantial region, I would suggest a study ,)f the Swiss system of Government which by sanctified conventions gives judicious share to all its main provinces and cultural components in every Government that is formed.



1. It the One Unit Scheme is to outlive the Government which imposes it, it must be based on the willing support of the people. This is only possible through a political campaign which aims at converting the hearts, convincing the mind,,, and arousing the enthusiasm of the people. I am convinced That it properly organized, this end can be achieved because I believe that the following assumptions are in fact true.

  1. That the One Unit Scheme is in effect beneficial to every part of West Pakistan and particularly to the smaller units.
  2. That the common people have no hostility to it.
  3. That the average citizen has, if properly assisted, enough intelligence and enough vision to see through the petty faction and narrow selfishness of the small interested group of disrupters.
2. We must, however, have a realistic appreciation of the situation. We begin under the shadow of a grave crisis resolved by unorthodox methods. We have to operate without a political organization. Time is of the essence, and time is short. We have to deal with experienced disrupters of recognized skill.

  The first necessity of the present contest, therefore, is that we must clear the decks before we launch our political campaign. In other words, we must silence and render inoperative all opposition of witch we are morally convinced that it is motivated by evil. We must take the benefit of full and firm exercise of authority to create an opportunity for our voice to be heard. I would give warning that in my opinion it would be fatal to launch our political campaign if, for a period, opposition is not effectively stilled and a time gained for our voice to gain volume amidst surrounding silence. Otherwise amidst the legacy of confusion which the present dispensation has inherited, we will lose all bearings amidst the babble which our first whispers will arouse.

  In my view, we could have achieved On Unit only at two stages of our history: (a) During the first days of our enthusiasm, when Pakistan was established; our unity and solidarity evoked by struggle, crowned by Access, sanctified in faith, stilled all lesser rumors under the guidance of the Quaid; (b) Now, when enthusiasm is at its lowest level, when expedient after expedient has failed, when a bitter frustration has settled upon our people and when in hopelessness and despair they are ready to accept dictation and be led where you will, so long as you lead them firmly, tail them now; and I fear, you fail them for all times.

I would guard against the charge of inconsistency. With one voice I assert that One Unit can only be obtained and preserved with consent; with the other I demand that all opposition must be stilled. Yet the two are not inconsistent. In the first place, we must win by force a chance to have our say. But once we have had our chance, we must be judged, sustained or rejected by the free approval of the people. I have no doubt that in a fine and just cause it will be forthcoming.

3. Our political campaign must, in its planning and initiation, be carefully organized and competently led. From the start, from today, we must provide for it a well-knit directive organization. I would suggest the establishment of a Work Party, a committee of Action, a tactical G.H.Q. that has patent authority, diversified talent and full effective representation of all provincial leadership. It must be the final authority to give shape to the ideology, to direct the campaign to give coherence and coordination to all aspects of the political effort.

4. The first aspect of the campaign is to gain the endorsement of the present representatives of the people-in all the provinces through resolution passed by the Provincial Assemblies, the Provincial Leagues etc. - we may call this the Parliamentary aspect.

  The real requisite for this is only one. Select your leadership in each province and put them firmly in place. Give them your entire confidence, pledge them your full and unreserved support in governance. Let them be the judges of the necessities and requirements of each situation, do not confuse them about the present system of law courts. Whether the real centers of administration will be I0 or 12 or more rationally delimited divisions presided over by senior-most responsible officers who are capable of an(empowered to dispose all matters that at present are decided at the provincial level, or whether a more rigid centralization is 6med at? From the very start, an informal working party should clarify the ideas of the present leadership on these points so that ,Be know what our people are to be conversed about.
C. Objections to ONE UNIT

1. The pattern of Provincial Governments is entrenched in our political consciousness. Any attempt to remove or even change the pattern will encounter strong opposition, particularly amongst the smaller Provinces, i.e., in all save Punjab. We must distinguish between the genuine fears and suspicions of small units who apprehended engulfment by the Punjab, and the feverish conspiracy of disrupters planning to weaken Pakistan or the design of small town politics to preserve undeserved power. The second can be summarily dealt with. But the first have to be met and stilled. It is my conviction that we have no right to advocate and advance ONE UNIT unless we are morally convinced and can convince our brothers in the small Provinces that our Scheme is to the first advantage of the smallest and the weakest amongst us. We must, therefore, in cooperation with the leaders of the other Provinces give sufficient, precision to the ONE UNIT Scheme such as effectively and institutionally remove the genuine objections against it.

2.Some of the objections most frequently advanced are the following:-

  1. In a unitary form of Government, one person one vote, Punjab, it is argued, would overwhelm all others. There are counter-arguments of considerable plausibility, but they would emotionally satisfy no one; they did not satisfy Punjab viz.-a-viz Bengal. A solution of this difficulty, which in many ways is the gravest, lies in the adoption of an imperfect democracy which so adjusts the electorate and the constituencies as to give a more than 50% representation in the Assembly to the non -Punjab districts of One Unit. This arrangement will have to remain in force for a considerable period of time.
  2. Services: The small units fear that with t h e p re se n t better education and standards in the Punjab areas, institution of common services would crowd out their own present citizens from Government resolved leadership. In many ways this objection has the largest emotional appeal, because it must be clearly realized that the Provincial services everywhere are the most vocal and influential part of the population, that they dominate the intellectual atmosphere, and are the real focus of behind the scene politics. In any case, their determined conspiratorial opposition would wreck the One Unit Government even if it takes actual shape. This objection, therefore, must be adequately met. Many solutions present themselves. Existing services will of course be preserved. Subordinate services can continue to be recruited locally. The real problem is the question of future recruitment to Provincial service. I feel a solution, through quota and special representation, must be sought which guarantees the minimum of the present proportion of each small Unit’s services (conceived) for at least a period of 15 years, and even for a longer time if facilities and educated man-power is not by then everywhere equalized.
  3. Administrative complexity and remoteness.

  4. An argument that will greatly appeal to the common man is that a Unitary Government for all West Pakistan would make the fulfillment of his common needs - his daily application permits, complaints against and redress of administrative high handiness, his legal remedies - too remote, too expensive, and therefore illusory for him. This is a serious and a genuine objection. A strictly centralized Government for West Pakistan would mean a negation of effective beneficent Government. Large devolution, particularly in matters of legal remedy and the mechanism of the beneficent departments is an absolute requisite before One Unit can be a genuinely workable proposition. In fact, the aim of our future policy should be to bring the benefits and operations of administration closer to the common man, rather than to make them more remote.
    If for no other reason, then to give clarification to meet the above objection, it is necessary to work out the One Unit Scheme in some detail. Its administrative implications must be known before they can convince. What shall be their position, or dishearten them by your own intervention in their political handling, which would arouse in them the suspicions of intrigues. You have given them a difficult task in which they are risking their necks. To prevaricate, to hesitate, to look back would be nothing short of treachery.
    (One guidance alone is necessary. Draft the resolution to be passed by the Assemblies, in consultation with them, but under your guidance. Khairpur has made a mess.) A time limit must be set within which this task has to be completed.
  5. The second aspect of the campaign, namely, public propaganda must be launched contemporaneously. It will take a considerable time to gain momentum or win significant approval, but if (a) the assent of representative leaders, i.e., M.L. As .has been induced, and (b) no doubt has been left in any mind that disrupters will be handled with sufficient firmness to discourage any inducement towards fishing gratuitously or safely in troubled waters, there is no doubt that the inherent logic and merit of the scheme will win complete and enthusiastic ultimate support - -ultimate’ to be understood in terms of weeks and months.

  6. The mechanics and organizations of the campaign require expert management and must be entrusted to the suggested Work Party who should function through specialized sub-Committees incharge of each category of work. The main categories of work are:-
    1. Statements by prominent persons; planned to achieve a gradual mounting.
    2. A coordinated Press campaign, ideologically controlled to lay similar emphasis everywhere on phased aspects of the movement.
    3. Pamphlets and tracts.
    4. Intensive political work directed with particular reference to special group such as
      1. the intelligentsia, i.e., Lawyers. (bar room), professors, doctors etc.
      2. Students,
      3. The dispossessed, i.e., labor, tenants, small owners. In my view, their support to us will bathe firmest and the most fruitful. This support can and be should be further evoked by the present regime’s (including provincial regimes) constructive and immediate steps towards progress, particularly through agrarian reform and a sustained campaign to bring down prices, which will underline and emphasize the leadership for One Units also the leadership for justice and progress. As in other directions, the first shot here too may be fired in Sindh,
      4. Mullahs may be used, but with extreme care because they are experts at abusing campaigns to secure their own rehabilitation, and then to use the platform gained to their own designs. If employed at all, only the least prominent rank and file should be selected, carefully avoiding the prominent practitioners.
    5. Direct mass contact through a spate of public meetings all over the country, addressed by properly briefed speakers. As ‘Jalsas’ are the traditional currency of our politics, they will be the culmination of our campaign and would require very careful organization.
  7. A final word about the role of the Punjab. At present we do not require too much noise in the Punjab, it will only put other people’s backup and cause suspicion. In fact our leaders should be very cautious in issuing statements or throwing their weight about. But two things must be borne in mind: (a) our best and most enthusiastic political workers are in the Punjab. They should be organized and put in readiness to be used in full force when ever and wherever they are needed; (b) It would not do to neglect completely the ‘climate of opinion’. It must be realized that in time Punjab may have to volunteer substantial concessions, which, I believe, will not be readily forthcoming. At the same time, the headquarters and motive force of all really disruptive leaderships, which will doubtless instigate and sustain opposition in all other Provinces, is located in the Punjab. Therefore, the leadership of the Punjab should have the solidarity and the competence to play its decisive role when the time comes, and from now on it should have the astuteness to keep a grip on the "climate of opinion".

  8.  (N.B.- All resolutions to be passed in the Punjab should be drafted in Karachi.)
  9. Lands: The new lands being developed in Sindh and the effect the One Unit Scheme will have on their Occupation and disposal is a matter which particularly agitates the Sindhi mind. Not strictly patriotic or national, this is nevertheless a natural apprehension because in this case the prospects of One Unit operate to the disadvantage of a long nursed and at that stage legitimate expectation.This problem has two aspects. Are the Sindh readership concerned for the Sindhi masses; In that case a just solution can be found. These lands are a trust for the poor and the dispossessed, Let us fix a priority for their use. They shall be first used to give an economic land holding unit to every single landless cultivator or "Hari’ of Sindh. Before that aim is fully achieved, not a single are shall be available to a non-Sindhi. But after this category is exhausted, they shall be available to other landless cultivators from areas outside Sindh.)n no case must this new resource of the nation be dispersed to enrich those who have already enough of their own. The other aspect is that some Sindhi leaders may consider land to be a legitimate prize for the already very prosperous Sindh landlords. This really is not a provincial matter. It is a question of moral and social policy, which affects the whole future shape, and ideology of Pakistan. I think, the answer is clear. Whether One Unit comes into being or not, no patriotic Government in Pakistan can allow reactionary policies which polarize wealth, and enrich the few while hundreds and thousands land less workers starve to their death.
  10. There is the cultural objection. provincial cultures, the Sindhi, the Baluchi, the Pathan will languish or even be suppressed, it administrative provincial units are merged in a single whole.

  11. This is a specious argument. It has already been pointed out that our present pattern of cultural diversity does not follow the provincial boundary line. Large and significant varieties of language and culture exist in each province and overflow every frontier. It may further be asked to what extent in the past seven years of provincial diversity has any province made any advance in the matter of the development and promotion of distinctive cultures? An ideal so infrequently agitated cannot lie very close to the heart.

    Yet cultural diversities exist, They give richness and variety to our life. No body may have done anything to promote their natural development, yet to do so is to quicken the throb of life amongst our people. The Government of One Unit should be pledged to it. The existing linguistic facilities and privilege must be preserved, and every distinctive variety of cultural expression should be given the autonomy and the encouragement to develop.

  1. The immediate objections of political policy before us today are: (a) restoration of the normal Unlettered functioning of democracy, and
(b) an agreed and fruitful settlement of the constitutional pattern for Pakistan
2. The relative priority of the two objectives is clearly established. The present emergency in the country is exclusively due to the constitutional deadlocks, which had made democracy a plaything of power politics, and reduced constitutional discussions to the level of counters in political intrigue. New elections without a large’ measure of prior constitutional agreement between relevant forces night result in insoluble deadlocks confronting a frustrated people, and would in any case subject constitutional settlement to the play of power politics. Therefore an agreement on the constitutional pattern must precede and not follow the restoration of democracy, if constitutional discussions are to be responsible and democracy fruitful.

3. The main problem of constitution - making is a precise definition of the federal structure, which, in effect, amounts to a settlement of the relationship between East Pakistan and the Provinces of West Pakistan. We cannot even enter into such a discussion, unless West Pakistan can speak as one entity: If the aim is interdependence and the absence of any possibility of domination, than East and West must face each other as two partners in a negotiation. A fragmented West Pakistan-bas really nothing to ask of East Pakistan, because the realities of the situation in any conceivable constitutional pattern would already have given East Pakistan an inconvertible superiority.

Therefore, the first step towards a general constitutional settlement is the achievement of unity in the provinces of West Pakistan through the establishment of one administrative Province for the whole of the Western region.

4. I think it is possible to achieve the formation of one Unit for West Pakistan because I believe that certain basic assumptions do in fact operate. They are:-

  (a) The ordinary common people are not hostile to it. If the obvious and overwhelming merits of the scheme are placed clearly before them the administrative advantage, the economic saving, the improvement in standards of political leadership, the greater coordination in a common march towards progress which would primarily operate to the advantage of the less developed and less prosperous areas, the automatic adjustment in the East-West relationship which would give poise and cordiality to an otherwise insoluble tension - the common people would support it everywhere.   (b) The present hostility based on an exploitation of artificial provincial is a creation of individual politicians, whose immediate position and status may thus appear threatened. Not being based on a genuine popular sentiment, these politicians who derive their only importance from the present position of vantage they occupy can be isolated and silenced if they do not occupy those positions.

(c) The real danger is that while certain politicians are left in a position to exploit sentiments of prejudice and ‘our province in danger’, and no attempt is made to pursue a vigorous and clearly formulated positive program in favor of ‘One Unit’, this will cause frustration amongst its supporters in the smaller Provinces, and give its opponents sufficient time to mobilize an emotional ‘danger complex’ amongst the people who will never have heard of their other side. For example, recent rebuffs to Rashdi and Khuhro and unexplainable wooing of Pirzada and the Red Shirts confuses the issue and darkens the prospect to an extent which no private reiteration of faith in ‘One Unit’ in high quarters can dispel. The fact of support is infinitely more important than expression of opinion. There is, however, still time to reverse this process.

(d) The main and only plausible argument against ‘One Unit’ is the fear of Punjab’s domination - the persuasive effect of which must not be minimized. This fear must be laid at rest. Since effective constitutional expedients are available to this end, and since Punjab does not stand in their way, this difficulty can easily be overcome, and in the interests of genuine justice must so be overcome. The only caution necessary is that during the present critical period, no scheme, whatsoever which deals with the future constitution, should be sponsored publicly by Punjab’s leadership. It is to provide too tempting a target to hostile solidarity, Perhaps a self-denying ordinance can be imposed on Malik Noon.

5. In an authoritarian climate, time becomes the essence of achievement. If a dictatorship takes either the turn to complete autocracy, or disrupts before the issues are fruitfully solved, political issues either lose relevance or dissolve in a cheese. While public enthusiasm is still there and before ossification has set in, patterns must be set. Those who rule without popular consent must rule with popular enthusiasm. One Unit’ therefore, if it is to be achieved at all, must be achieved-at once How can this be done? 6. One method must be renounced at the very start. Pure force will not do. It would destroy the willing adherence and acceptance of the smaller provinces Which is the only climate of opinion’ in which future nationhood can grow. Besides a ‘One Unit’ thus forced will not outlast the regime, which has imposed it. Its dissolution will inevitably become the main slogan of the next elections, it will present an irresistible opportunity to the politicians of East Bengal to revert to the ‘small brother’ role of West disruption, it will destroy the as yet unfixed foundation of the interim ‘One Unit’ government which would require the restraint and toleration of cordiality to find its roots, and above all it would for all times isolate Punjab as the villain of the piece which tried to force its selfishness down unwilling orphaned throats, thus crushing it between Bengal’s domination and the small provinces’ suspicion and hatred.

  If One Unit is achieved by force, it will have to be maintained by force, thus making autocracy a necessity of our situation. Non-political handling on a purely administrative authoritarian level would therefore be disastrous. We must therefore achieve ‘One Unit’ through political methods. I suggest the following phases:-

7. The first phase is an immediate one. It is a negative one. It consists in clearing the decks. All obvious committed’ obstacles in the way of ‘One Unit’ must be removed. On political terms our country is insufficiently developed. In this atmosphere a clear and firm indication of which way the wind is blowing, does actually help the wind to blow that way. The following steps should be taken:-

(a) The Central Government’s sympathy for the aim of ‘One Unit’ must be made clear. Counter-indications such as Talpur’s statement must be banned. The possible role of the Bengal contingent, tongue in cheek, dog in manger, whose one vindication is the dissolution of the present set-up, must be guarded against.

(b) Hostile elements in the provinces - patent or latent - must be eliminated, particularly when their only power depends on central patronage. Let the Center nod with decision, and not, like a palsied head in every direction.

(c) Sindh holds the kernel. Pirzada leads the opposition; his past symbolizes it. He is also an exotic growth, which withers without patronage. Present indications are that he is building up to a tactical show of strength which would be a demonstration at once of his own support and One Unit hostility which would queer Pitch to a speedy solution. A hostile resolution anywhere would take months to undo, and we have only week .Pirzada, therefore, must go at once. A person who has the character and the authority to prepare the ground for Sindh acceptance of One Unit must immediately replace him.

This denouement should take place within days if not hours.
      (ii) N.W.F.P. has been mishandled. Rashid and the old Muslim Leaguers would have obviously risen to the occasion in support. Qayyum’s exit had cleared their path, given them enormous prestige by removing a dishonest but much publicized obstacle. But a much more formidable force has replaced Qaiyum - the Red shirts - which have been gratuitously rehabilitated. If the rehabilitation had been on precise conditions, there would have been some point to it, although Abdul Ghaffar could never have been trusted therefore, why conjure up a friend safely corked in the bottle but even this does not seem to have been done. And those who give Khan Sahib a political personality independent from Abdul Ghaffar Khan will soon know their mistake. United they stand, divided only Khan Sahib falls.

    The Position must be retrieved, Firstly by giving full unreserved support to Rashid, stilling his suspicious, fortifying his nerve, encouraging him to ignore Red Shirts and strengthen the old leaguers thus countering the irresistible impression which must have percolated to the remotest Frontier village. Qurban Ali Khan can do this well. Secondly by completely ignoring Abdul Ghaffar. No negotiations, no parley because through them no will strengthen himself politically and then put down his strength in a volt-face to overwhelm us. There should be no doubt about it that politically we are no match for him, and our ideological superiority we have ourselves renounced.

    (iii) Punjab must be kept quiet. The folly of our friends most be checked. At a later stage Punjab will have to take the lead. At that time I hope an effective intelligent Punjab leadership will have been put in place both at the Center and at Lahore.

    (iv) States must by their condition bow to authority. Bahawalpur might have been tackled better by getting a resolution in favor before dismissal of the Ministry. Surely political considerations should have preceded administrative one. Now the best alternative is to get the. Muslim League to endorse. Makhdumul Mulk would love to do so. If acceptance of One Unit is a condition of continuing in present power, all states will fall in line.

    (v) A little persuasion can bring Balochistan’s League leaders in line. The Jirga has never yet been known to say ‘no’ to authority.

    (c) While the deck is thus speedily cleared in the West, it is possible to negotiate with Suharwardy either to openly support One Unit or to adopt a neutral attitude of distinct benevolence.

8.Once decks are cleared, Positive political work through favorable leaderships already placed in Position in all provinces must start. A time limit should be fixed for this, and I would suggest 4 weeks. This may be phased thus: 9. An alternative should be considered. It has been suggested that instead of a One-Unit campaign, we should concentrate on a preliminary ‘merger’ campaign. The smaller units and states should first seek union with larger units: Karachi, part of Balochistan with Sindh, Part of Balochistan with Frontier, Bahawalpur with Punjab, and then when the multiplicity has been reduced to a trinity, induce the unity of Sindh and Punjab to face N.W.F.P. with a cul-de-sac. This is probably advocated because it is assumed to be easier. I think it is no easier to persuade Bahawalpur or Balochistan to join a larger province than to join West Pakistan. Besides if we start with this process, we may stop dead at the trinity. This would be to have achieved nothing. Three or two units are no solution, they are even no appreciable improvements; the real problem of Pakistan’s constitutional pattern remains as involved and as lop-sided as ever. The greatest danger however is that we will have unwittingly worked with our own hands to the achievement of PAKHTOONISTAN. I therefore reject this alternative.

10. We cannot afford to give more than 4 weeks to the process envisaged in para 7 above, because the achievement of One Unit is only a necessary parliamentary to the general constitutional settlement which is the pre-condition of the restoration of democracy.  Acceptance of One Unit by Western leadership, who should be kept in place of power to consolidate the gains achieved, must be immediately and dramatically followed by highest level negotiations with the genuine leaders of Bengal primarily Suharwardy, because he has the ambition and the intelligence to respond. On the basis of a tout-subject Center, two provinces, federal parity, complete provincial and .cultural autonomy, I think it might be possible to gain his support as soon as he returns to Karachi and before he goes to East Pakistan.

11. If agreement on One Unit and constitutional pattern is arrived at this must be announced as a common platform of a united East West leadership on which they are prepared to face the electorate.

12. At this stage two developments should immediately follow (in January, I hope):

    (a) Broadening of the Central Cabinet to include topmost popular leaders from the West and particularly from the East - a real national Government.

    (b) The immediate constitution and convening of a Constituent Assembly, indirectly from Provincial Legislatures, to frame a constitution within a specified period quite plausibly within 3 months. The C.A. should have not other task except to frame a constitution and should not serve as a Legislature. As previous constitutional agreement will already have been reached and will be serving as a mandate to a vast majority of the newly elected C.A., and as the interim Cabinet will already have been broad-based, I have no fears from either the one or the other. People who have no power, will not delay constitution—making. People who really represent the people and who by having reached an agreement will have capitalized on a wave of popularity, will not fear elections.

13. General Elections under new constitution to be held in October, 1955. No other process could have anticipated an earlier consummation.

14. I need not labor that a recent solution suggested by Malik Noon has no merit. Constitution making by ordinance has its obvious disadvantage, It does not achieve One Unit. It does not bring about political agreement. In fact the one real merit of the present regime in that it can hold a pistol to achieve political constitutional agreement. If the pistol is used for any other purpose, I think, the destiny of Pakistan have been betrayed.

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